CVE-2025-52467
BaseFortify
Publication date: 2025-06-19
Last updated on: 2025-06-23
Assigner: GitHub, Inc.
Description
Description
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-200 | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?
CVE-2025-52467 is a critical vulnerability in the pgai Python library's GitHub Actions workflow. The workflow used the 'pull_request_target' event trigger, which runs with full repository secrets and a GITHUB_TOKEN that has write permissions. This allowed an attacker submitting a malicious pull request from a forked repository to execute untrusted code with elevated privileges, exfiltrate all secrets used in the workflow (including the GITHUB_TOKEN), and potentially tamper with the repository by pushing arbitrary code, modifying repository objects, or publishing malicious releases. [2]
How can this vulnerability impact me? :
This vulnerability can have severe impacts including unauthorized access to all secrets used in the workflow, such as the GITHUB_TOKEN with write permissions. An attacker could use these to tamper with the repository by pushing arbitrary code, modifying repository contents, poisoning the codebase, or publishing malicious releases on GitHub and PyPI. This poses a significant supply-chain risk and could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of your codebase and releases. [2]
How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?
This vulnerability can be detected by auditing your GitHub Actions workflows, specifically checking if any workflow uses the `pull_request_target` event trigger with write permissions to repository secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN`. You should look for workflows that check out pull request code and run scripts with elevated permissions. Commands to detect this include using GitHub CLI or API to list workflows and their triggers, for example: `gh workflow view <workflow-name> --repo timescale/pgai` or inspecting `.github/workflows/huggingface-dataset.yml` for the `pull_request_target` event. Additionally, reviewing recent workflow runs for suspicious activity or unauthorized secret access can help detect exploitation attempts. [2]
What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?
Immediate mitigation steps include changing the GitHub Actions workflow event trigger from `pull_request_target` to `pull_request` to prevent workflows from running with elevated permissions on untrusted code. Restrict the `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions to read-only for workflows that do not require write access. Rotate any exposed secrets such as `HUGGINGFACE_HUB_TIMESCALE_TOKEN`. Review and audit all workflow executions and repository activity for signs of compromise. Apply the patch commit 8eb3567 that implements these changes. [2, 1]