CVE-2025-26438
BaseFortify
Publication date: 2025-09-04
Last updated on: 2025-09-05
Assigner: Android (associated with Google Inc. or Open Handset Alliance)
Description
Description
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| android | 13.0 | |
| android | 14.0 | |
| android | 15.0 |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-287 | When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. |
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the Bluetooth Security Manager Protocol (SMP) within the Android Bluetooth stack (Fluoride). It occurs when a malicious Bluetooth device claims to have Out-Of-Band (OOB) data during pairing, but the local device does not have any stored OOB data. Because the Android stack sets the OOB randomizer to zero in this case, an attacker can exploit this to bypass SMP authentication and pair without proper verification. [1]
How can this vulnerability impact me? :
This vulnerability can allow a remote attacker to escalate privileges by bypassing Bluetooth SMP authentication without needing any additional execution privileges or user interaction. This means an attacker could pair with your device without proper authentication, potentially gaining unauthorized access or control over Bluetooth communications. [1]
How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?
This vulnerability can be detected by monitoring Bluetooth pairing attempts where a peer claims to have Out-Of-Band (OOB) data but the local device has no stored OOB data. Detection involves analyzing Bluetooth pairing logs or traffic for suspicious SMP authentication bypass attempts. Since the issue is in the Android Bluetooth stack (Fluoride), one approach is to build and run the updated Fluoride Bluetooth stack with the patch applied to test and observe behavior. Specific commands include building the Fluoride stack using the provided build instructions (e.g., using build.py with --run-bootstrap), running the Bluetooth stack targeting the default interface (hci0), and monitoring pairing logs for OOB claims without local OOB data. However, no direct detection commands are provided in the resources. [1]
What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?
Immediate mitigation involves updating the Android Bluetooth stack (Fluoride) to the patched version that drops connections immediately if a peer claims to have OOB data while no local OOB data is available. This prevents the authentication bypass. If updating is not immediately possible, disabling Bluetooth pairing or restricting Bluetooth usage until the patch can be applied may reduce risk. Applying the patch committed on January 15, 2025, and merged on March 12, 2025, is the definitive fix. [1]