Executive Summary

This vulnerability exists in Weaviate OSS versions before 1.33.4. It is caused by a lack of validation of the fileName field in the transfer logic. An attacker who can invoke the GetFile method while a shard is in the 'Pause file activity' state and the FileReplicationService is reachable can exploit this to read arbitrary files accessible to the service process.

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Detection Guidance

Detection involves checking if the Shard Movement API is enabled and if shards are in the "Pause file activity" state, as exploitation requires these conditions. Since the API is disabled by default, verify the "REPLICA_MOVEMENT_ENABLED" flag status in your configuration. Additionally, monitor calls to the GetFile method with suspicious fileName parameters containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ".." or absolute paths). Specific commands are not provided in the resources. [1]

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Mitigation Strategies

Immediate mitigation steps include updating Weaviate to the fixed versions (1.33.4 or later) that address this vulnerability. Alternatively, disable the Shard Movement API by setting the "REPLICA_MOVEMENT_ENABLED" flag to false in your configuration. These actions will prevent exploitation of the path traversal vulnerability in the GetFile method. [1]

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Impact Analysis

The vulnerability allows an attacker to read arbitrary files accessible to the service process, which could lead to unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information or data leakage.

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