CVE-2025-68477
Unknown Unknown - Not Provided
SSRF in Langflow API Request Component Allows Internal Access

Publication date: 2025-12-19

Last updated on: 2025-12-19

Assigner: GitHub, Inc.

Description
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possibleβ€”accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.
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Meta Information
Published
2025-12-19
Last Modified
2025-12-19
Generated
2026-05-07
AI Q&A
2025-12-19
EPSS Evaluated
2026-05-05
NVD
EUVD
Affected Vendors & Products
Showing 1 associated CPE
Vendor Product Version / Range
langflow-ai langflow *
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
CWE
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KEV
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CWE ID Description
CWE-918 The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?

CVE-2025-68477 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Langflow versions prior to 1.7.0. Langflow's API Request component allows users to specify URLs for HTTP requests within a workflow, but it only performs minimal validation and does not block requests to private IP ranges or cloud metadata endpoints. An attacker who can control the API Request URL and has an API key can exploit this to make the server send requests to internal network resources and receive the responses directly. This enables attackers to access internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases, leading to information disclosure and potential further attacks. The issue was fixed in version 1.7.0 by adding proper validation and blocking of such internal addresses. [1]


How can this vulnerability impact me? :

This vulnerability can allow attackers to scan internal network assets and exfiltrate sensitive data from internal administrative endpoints, proxies, metrics dashboards, and management consoles. It also enables access to cloud metadata services, which can lead to theft of instance metadata and credentials. The SSRF can be used as a foothold for further attacks, including chaining to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Because the response is returned directly, attackers can immediately exploit the data. In multi-tenant environments, this can cause cross-tenant data leakage and high-impact breaches, while even single-tenant setups are at risk depending on internal network policies. [1]


How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?

Detection can involve monitoring for unusual or unauthorized API calls to the vulnerable endpoints (/api/v1/run and /api/v1/run/advanced) that include URLs pointing to private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, 10.x.x.x, 172.x.x.x, 192.x.x.x) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). You can inspect logs for API requests containing such URLs. Additionally, testing with crafted API requests that attempt to access internal resources via the API Request component can confirm vulnerability. For example, using curl to invoke the flow execution endpoint with an API key and a flow containing an API Request node targeting an internal IP can reveal if SSRF is possible. Example command: curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>" -X POST -d '{"flow": {"nodes": [{"type": "API Request", "url": "http://127.0.0.1/admin"}]}}' https://<langflow-server>/api/v1/run/advanced/<FLOW_ID> [1]


What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?

The immediate mitigation step is to upgrade Langflow to version 1.7.0 or later, where the vulnerability is patched by adding proper validation and blocking of private/internal IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Until the upgrade, restrict access to the API endpoints (/api/v1/run and /api/v1/run/advanced) to trusted users only, and monitor for suspicious API usage. Network-level controls such as firewall rules blocking outgoing requests from the Langflow server to internal IP ranges and metadata endpoints can also reduce risk. [1]


How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:

The vulnerability allows attackers to access and exfiltrate sensitive internal data, including administrative endpoints and cloud metadata services, which can lead to unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such data breaches can result in non-compliance with standards and regulations like GDPR and HIPAA that require protection of personal and sensitive data. Therefore, exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to violations of these compliance requirements due to unauthorized data access and potential data leakage. [1]


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