CVE-2026-32111
Server-Side Request Forgery in ha-mcp OAuth Consent Form
Publication date: 2026-03-11
Last updated on: 2026-03-17
Assigner: GitHub, Inc.
Description
Description
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| homeassistant-ai | home_assistant_mcp_server | to 7.0.0 (exc) |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-918 | The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. |
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?
[{'type': 'paragraph', 'content': "CVE-2026-32111 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the ha-mcp package's OAuth consent form beta feature prior to version 7.0.0. The vulnerability occurs because the server accepts a user-supplied URL (ha_url) and makes an HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config without validating the URL's scheme, IP address, or domain."}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'This lack of validation allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit arbitrary URLs and perform internal network reconnaissance by analyzing different error messages returned from the server. These error messages reveal information about host availability and port status, effectively acting as an error oracle.'}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'Three code paths are affected: the OAuth consent form validation, REST tool calls with forged tokens, and WebSocket tool calls with forged tokens. Attackers can automate attacks by registering clients and submitting arbitrary URLs without user interaction.'}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'The vulnerability is fixed in ha-mcp version 7.0.0.'}] [1]
How can this vulnerability impact me? :
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to perform internal network reconnaissance from the serverβs network position. By exploiting the error oracle, attackers can map reachable hosts and open ports within the internal network.
Additionally, attackers can forge OAuth tokens to make REST API and WebSocket calls to arbitrary hosts within the internal network, potentially gathering JSON responses from Home Assistant API endpoints if present.
However, effective data exfiltration is limited because non-Home Assistant services are unlikely to respond with useful JSON data, and WebSocket protocol failures limit exploitation.
Overall, the impact is moderate (CVSS 5.3) and primarily involves information disclosure about the internal network rather than direct data compromise or service disruption.
How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:
I don't know
How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?
This vulnerability can be detected by observing if the ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts user-supplied ha_url values and makes server-side HTTP requests to {ha_url}/api/config without URL validation. Detection involves checking for unusual or unauthorized HTTP requests originating from the ha-mcp server to internal or unexpected network addresses.
One way to detect exploitation attempts is to monitor network traffic or server logs for requests to various internal IP addresses or URLs that are not normally accessed, especially those resulting in distinct error messages such as connection errors, timeouts, or HTTP 401/403 responses.
Suggested commands to detect this behavior include:
- Use network monitoring tools like tcpdump or Wireshark to capture outgoing HTTP requests from the ha-mcp server: tcpdump -i <interface> host <ha-mcp-server-ip> and port 80 or 443
- Check server logs for unusual HTTP GET requests to /api/config endpoints with varying hostnames or IP addresses.
- Use curl or similar tools to manually test the OAuth consent form by submitting different ha_url values and observing server responses and logs.
What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?
The immediate and recommended mitigation step is to upgrade the ha-mcp package to version 7.0.0 or later, where this vulnerability is fixed.
Additionally, if possible, disable the OAuth consent form beta feature or restrict access to it until the upgrade is applied.
Ensure that the primary deployment method using a pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN is used, as it is not affected by this vulnerability.