CVE-2026-32111
Received Received - Intake
Server-Side Request Forgery in ha-mcp OAuth Consent Form

Publication date: 2026-03-11

Last updated on: 2026-03-17

Assigner: GitHub, Inc.

Description
ha-mcp is a Home Assistant MCP Server. Prior to 7.0.0, the ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied ha_url and makes a server-side HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive. The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN) is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.
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Meta Information
Published
2026-03-11
Last Modified
2026-03-17
Generated
2026-05-07
AI Q&A
2026-03-11
EPSS Evaluated
2026-05-05
NVD
EUVD
Affected Vendors & Products
Showing 1 associated CPE
Vendor Product Version / Range
homeassistant-ai home_assistant_mcp_server to 7.0.0 (exc)
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
CWE
CWE Icon
KEV
KEV Icon
CWE ID Description
CWE-918 The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?

[{'type': 'paragraph', 'content': "CVE-2026-32111 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the ha-mcp package's OAuth consent form beta feature prior to version 7.0.0. The vulnerability occurs because the server accepts a user-supplied URL (ha_url) and makes an HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config without validating the URL's scheme, IP address, or domain."}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'This lack of validation allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit arbitrary URLs and perform internal network reconnaissance by analyzing different error messages returned from the server. These error messages reveal information about host availability and port status, effectively acting as an error oracle.'}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'Three code paths are affected: the OAuth consent form validation, REST tool calls with forged tokens, and WebSocket tool calls with forged tokens. Attackers can automate attacks by registering clients and submitting arbitrary URLs without user interaction.'}, {'type': 'paragraph', 'content': 'The vulnerability is fixed in ha-mcp version 7.0.0.'}] [1]


How can this vulnerability impact me? :

This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to perform internal network reconnaissance from the server’s network position. By exploiting the error oracle, attackers can map reachable hosts and open ports within the internal network.

Additionally, attackers can forge OAuth tokens to make REST API and WebSocket calls to arbitrary hosts within the internal network, potentially gathering JSON responses from Home Assistant API endpoints if present.

However, effective data exfiltration is limited because non-Home Assistant services are unlikely to respond with useful JSON data, and WebSocket protocol failures limit exploitation.

Overall, the impact is moderate (CVSS 5.3) and primarily involves information disclosure about the internal network rather than direct data compromise or service disruption.


How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:

I don't know


How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?

This vulnerability can be detected by observing if the ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts user-supplied ha_url values and makes server-side HTTP requests to {ha_url}/api/config without URL validation. Detection involves checking for unusual or unauthorized HTTP requests originating from the ha-mcp server to internal or unexpected network addresses.

One way to detect exploitation attempts is to monitor network traffic or server logs for requests to various internal IP addresses or URLs that are not normally accessed, especially those resulting in distinct error messages such as connection errors, timeouts, or HTTP 401/403 responses.

Suggested commands to detect this behavior include:

  • Use network monitoring tools like tcpdump or Wireshark to capture outgoing HTTP requests from the ha-mcp server: tcpdump -i <interface> host <ha-mcp-server-ip> and port 80 or 443
  • Check server logs for unusual HTTP GET requests to /api/config endpoints with varying hostnames or IP addresses.
  • Use curl or similar tools to manually test the OAuth consent form by submitting different ha_url values and observing server responses and logs.

What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?

The immediate and recommended mitigation step is to upgrade the ha-mcp package to version 7.0.0 or later, where this vulnerability is fixed.

Additionally, if possible, disable the OAuth consent form beta feature or restrict access to it until the upgrade is applied.

Ensure that the primary deployment method using a pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN is used, as it is not affected by this vulnerability.


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