CVE-2026-30613
Received Received - Intake
Information Disclosure via UART Debug Interface in AZIOT 1 Node Switch

Publication date: 2026-04-06

Last updated on: 2026-04-07

Assigner: MITRE

Description
An information disclosure vulnerability exists in AZIOT 1 Node Smart Switch (16amp)- WiFi/Bluetooth Enabled Software Version: 1.1.9 due to improper access control on the UART debug interface. An attacker with physical access can connect to the UART interface and obtain sensitive information from the serial console without authentication.
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Meta Information
Published
2026-04-06
Last Modified
2026-04-07
Generated
2026-05-07
AI Q&A
2026-04-06
EPSS Evaluated
2026-05-05
NVD
EUVD
Affected Vendors & Products
Showing 4 associated CPEs
Vendor Product Version / Range
aziot node_smart_switch 1.1.9
aziot 1_node_smart_switch 1.1.9
tuya tuyaos 3.8.31
beken bk7231 *
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
CWE
CWE Icon
KEV
KEV Icon
CWE ID Description
CWE-200 The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:

The vulnerability allows an attacker with physical access to the device to obtain sensitive information from the UART debug interface without authentication. This unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information could lead to non-compliance with data protection regulations such as GDPR and HIPAA, which require protection of sensitive data against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Since the vulnerability involves improper access control leading to information disclosure, organizations using affected devices may face increased risk of violating privacy and security requirements mandated by these standards.


Can you explain this vulnerability to me?

CVE-2026-30613 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the AZIOT 1 Node Smart Switch (16amp) WiFi/Bluetooth enabled device, specifically version 1.1.9 of its software. The issue arises from improper access control on the UART debug interface, which allows an attacker with physical access to connect to the UART interface and obtain sensitive information from the serial console without any authentication.

Technically, the vulnerability affects devices using the Beken BK7231 chipset family. By connecting to the UART interface at 115200 baud, an attacker can access detailed bootloader and firmware logs, including system registers, flash memory status, firmware versioning, and network stack initialization data. Specialized tools like bk7231tools and picocom can be used to extract firmware or manipulate device behavior through this interface.


How can this vulnerability impact me? :

This vulnerability can impact you by allowing an attacker with physical access to your AZIOT smart switch device to extract sensitive information from the device's firmware and debug logs without needing authentication. This could lead to exposure of confidential device data, firmware intellectual property, or potentially enable further attacks by manipulating the device's firmware or operation.

Since the attacker needs physical access to the UART interface, the risk is primarily in environments where unauthorized individuals can physically interact with the device. Exploiting this vulnerability could compromise the security and privacy of your smart home or IoT environment.


How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?

This vulnerability can be detected by physically accessing the UART debug interface of the AZIOT 1 Node Smart Switch (16amp) running software version 1.1.9 and connecting to it via a serial communication tool.

To detect the vulnerability, connect to the UART interface at 115200 baud rate using a terminal program such as picocom.

  • Use the command: picocom -b 115200 /dev/ttyUSB0 (replace /dev/ttyUSB0 with the appropriate serial device)
  • Observe the UART output for bootloader and firmware initialization logs, including system registers, flash memory status, and firmware versioning.
  • Use tools like bk7231tools for firmware extraction and flashing if further analysis is needed.

What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?

Immediate mitigation steps involve restricting physical access to the device to prevent attackers from connecting to the UART debug interface.

Since the vulnerability requires physical access to the UART interface, securing the device physically and disabling or protecting UART debug ports can reduce risk.

Additionally, monitor for firmware updates or patches from the vendor that address improper access control on the UART interface.


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