CVE-2026-35665
Received Received - Intake
Denial of Service via Slow POST Requests in OpenClaw Feishu Webhook

Publication date: 2026-04-10

Last updated on: 2026-04-13

Assigner: VulnCheck

Description
OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32011 where the Feishu webhook handler accepts request bodies with permissive limits of 1MB and 30-second timeout before signature verification. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint, blocking legitimate webhook deliveries.
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Meta Information
Published
2026-04-10
Last Modified
2026-04-13
Generated
2026-05-07
AI Q&A
2026-04-10
EPSS Evaluated
2026-05-05
NVD
EUVD
Affected Vendors & Products
Showing 1 associated CPE
Vendor Product Version / Range
openclaw openclaw to 2026.3.24 (exc)
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
CWE
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KEV
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CWE ID Description
CWE-405 The product does not properly control situations in which an adversary can cause the product to consume or produce excessive resources without requiring the adversary to invest equivalent work or otherwise prove authorization, i.e., the adversary's influence is "asymmetric."
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AI Powered Q&A
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?

CVE-2026-35665 is a vulnerability in OpenClaw versions before 2026.3.24 affecting the Feishu webhook handler. The handler accepts HTTP POST request bodies with permissive limits of up to 1MB in size and a 30-second timeout before verifying the request signature. This incomplete fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2026-32011) allows an unauthenticated attacker to send slow HTTP POST requests that trickle data very slowly, holding connections open for up to 30 seconds.

By opening multiple concurrent slow connections (around 50), the attacker can exhaust server connection resources, causing legitimate webhook deliveries to be blocked and resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). No valid webhook signature or credentials are required to exploit this issue.


How can this vulnerability impact me? :

This vulnerability can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) on any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu webhook. An attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending multiple slow HTTP POST requests concurrently, blocking legitimate webhook deliveries.

  • The Feishu webhook endpoint is publicly accessible, making it directly targetable.
  • Approximately 50 concurrent slow connections can exhaust server capacity for 30 seconds per attack wave.
  • Memory consumption can reach about 50MB per attack wave due to buffering of request bodies.
  • No privileges, user interaction, or valid credentials are required to exploit this vulnerability.

How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?

This vulnerability can be detected by monitoring for multiple concurrent slow HTTP POST requests targeting the Feishu webhook endpoint, typically at the path /feishu/events with Content-Type: application/json.

An attacker exploits the permissive limits by sending slow-body or Slowloris-style requests that trickle data very slowly (e.g., 1 byte per second) for up to 30 seconds, exhausting server connection resources.

To detect such activity, you can use network monitoring tools or commands to identify many simultaneous slow POST connections to the Feishu webhook endpoint.

  • Use netstat or ss to check for many open connections to the server on the HTTP port (e.g., 80 or 443) with long durations:
  • netstat -anp | grep ':80' | grep ESTABLISHED | wc -l
  • ss -tnp state established '( dport = :80 )' | wc -l
  • Use tools like tcpdump or Wireshark to capture and analyze HTTP POST requests to /feishu/events and look for slow data transfer patterns.
  • Use application logs to identify slow or hanging POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.

What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?

Immediate mitigation involves reducing the permissive pre-authentication request body size and timeout limits for the Feishu webhook handler to match the stricter limits used by other webhook handlers.

Specifically, configure the Feishu webhook handler to enforce a maximum request body size of 64KB and a timeout of 5 seconds before signature verification.

This change prevents attackers from holding connections open for long periods with slow POST requests, thereby reducing the risk of resource exhaustion and Denial of Service.

Additionally, monitor your server for unusual numbers of slow or hanging connections to the Feishu webhook endpoint and consider implementing rate limiting or connection limits at the network or application level.

Currently, no patched version exists specifically for this issue in the Feishu extension, so manual configuration or code changes are necessary.


How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:

The provided information does not specify any direct impact of this vulnerability on compliance with common standards and regulations such as GDPR or HIPAA.


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