CVE-2026-48686
Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in FastNetMon Community Edition
Publication date: 2026-05-26
Last updated on: 2026-05-26
Assigner: MITRE
Description
Description
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| fastnetmon | community_edition | to 1.2.9 (inc) |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-UNKNOWN |
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:
CVE-2026-48686 is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution in FastNetMon's BGP NLRI decoder. Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the FastNetMon process user.
Such unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data or disruption of network monitoring services, which may impact compliance with standards and regulations like GDPR and HIPAA that require protection of personal data and system integrity.
Mitigations such as applying the fix with proper input validation, enabling compiler hardening flags, restricting BGP peers, running FastNetMon under low-privilege users, and monitoring for malformed BGP messages are recommended to reduce the risk and help maintain compliance.
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?
CVE-2026-48686 is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in FastNetMon Community Edition through version 1.2.9, specifically in the BGP NLRI decoder function decode_bgp_subnet_encoding_ipv4_raw(). The function reads a prefix bit length from a BGP packet without validating that it is less than or equal to 32 for IPv4 prefixes.
This unchecked value is used to calculate how many bytes to copy into a 4-byte stack buffer using memcpy, which can result in copying up to 32 bytes into a 4-byte buffer, causing a stack buffer overflow of up to 28 bytes.
This overflow can overwrite the saved return address on the stack, enabling an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely. Additionally, the invalid prefix bit length can cause undefined behavior in related functions.
How can this vulnerability impact me? :
This vulnerability can allow an attacker who is a configured BGP peer or who has compromised an existing BGP peer to exploit the stack buffer overflow and achieve remote code execution on the FastNetMon process.
Exploitation can lead to unauthorized access, system instability, or full compromise of the affected system running FastNetMon.
Because the default FastNetMon build lacks common security hardening flags, exploitation is straightforward, increasing the risk.
- Remote code execution as the FastNetMon process user
- Potential system instability or denial of service
- Unauthorized access through compromised BGP peers
How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?
This vulnerability can be detected by monitoring BGP session logs for malformed UPDATE messages that contain invalid prefix bit lengths exceeding 32.
Operators should look for unusual or malformed BGP NLRI attributes from their BGP peers, especially those using GoBGP or ExaBGP.
While specific commands are not provided, typical detection steps include capturing and inspecting BGP UPDATE messages using network packet analyzers like tcpdump or Wireshark, filtering for BGP traffic on port 179.
- Use tcpdump to capture BGP packets: tcpdump -i <interface> port 179 -w bgp_capture.pcap
- Analyze captured packets in Wireshark to inspect NLRI prefix lengths for values greater than 32.
Additionally, reviewing FastNetMon logs for errors or warnings related to BGP NLRI decoding may help identify exploitation attempts.
What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?
Immediate mitigation steps include applying the official patch that adds bounds checking to ensure the prefix bit length does not exceed 32.
In addition, enable compiler hardening flags such as -fstack-protector, -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, -fPIE/-pie, and RELRO to reduce the risk of exploitation.
Restrict BGP peers to trusted entities only, minimizing exposure to potentially malicious or compromised peers.
Run FastNetMon under a low-privilege user account to limit the impact of any successful exploitation.
Monitor BGP session logs continuously for malformed UPDATE messages that could indicate exploitation attempts.