CVE-2026-11341
Command Injection in D-Link DWR-M920 Router Firmware
Publication date: 2026-06-05
Last updated on: 2026-06-05
Assigner: VulDB
Description
Description
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| d-link | dwr-m920 | to 1.1.50 (inc) |
| d-link | dwr-m920 | 1.1.5 |
| d-link | dwr-m920 | 1.1.7 |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-77 | The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
| CWE-78 | The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
Attack-Flow Graph
AI Powered Q&A
How does this vulnerability affect compliance with common standards and regulations (like GDPR, HIPAA)?:
The vulnerability allows remote OS command injection on affected D-Link DWR-M920 routers, potentially enabling attackers to execute arbitrary commands and gain control over the device.
Such unauthorized access and control could lead to compromise of sensitive data or network integrity, which may result in non-compliance with data protection standards and regulations like GDPR or HIPAA that require safeguarding personal and sensitive information.
However, the provided information does not explicitly describe the direct impact on compliance with these standards.
Can you explain this vulnerability to me?
CVE-2026-11341 is a vulnerability in D-Link DWR-M920 routers running certain firmware versions. It exists in the /boafrm/formIMEISetup handler of the Boa web server, specifically in the processing of the IMEI_value POST parameter.
The vulnerability allows an attacker to perform OS command injection by manipulating the IMEI_value parameter, which is directly passed into a command string and executed without proper sanitization or length checks.
This can lead to arbitrary command execution on the device remotely, as the parameter is used in AT command strings for different modem modules and can be exploited by injecting shell metacharacters.
Additionally, there is a stack buffer overflow due to lack of length validation when copying IMEI_value into a fixed-size buffer, which can corrupt memory and enable remote code execution.
How can this vulnerability impact me? :
This vulnerability can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the affected router without user interaction, potentially taking full control of the device.
Exploitation can lead to unauthorized access, disruption of network services, device crashes, or the router being used as a foothold for further attacks within the network.
Because the attack requires a valid session cookie and a supported 4G modem, it may be limited to attackers who can obtain such access, but once exploited, the impact can be severe.
How can this vulnerability be detected on my network or system? Can you suggest some commands?
This vulnerability can be detected by attempting to exploit the IMEI_value parameter in the /boafrm/formIMEISetup handler of the D-Link DWR-M920 router's Boa web server.
An attacker can verify remote code execution by injecting commands such as '; id #' or ; id # into the IMEI_value POST parameter and observing the response.
Detection commands can include sending crafted HTTP POST requests with payloads like 'IMEI_value='; id #' or 'IMEI_value=; id #' to the vulnerable endpoint and checking for command execution results or delayed responses (e.g., using sleep 5).
Additionally, sending oversized payloads to the IMEI_value parameter may cause the router to crash, indicating the presence of the stack buffer overflow vulnerability.
What immediate steps should I take to mitigate this vulnerability?
Immediate mitigation steps include validating the IMEI_value parameter to ensure it contains exactly 15 decimal digits and rejecting any shell metacharacters.
Replacing unsafe functions like sprintf() and system() with safer alternatives such as snprintf() and execve() in the firmware can prevent exploitation.
Since exploitation requires a valid Boa session cookie and a supported 4G modem, restricting access to the web interface and limiting modem support can reduce risk.
Applying firmware updates from the vendor that address these issues is recommended once available.