CVE-2026-47065
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Proxy Class Deserialization Bypass in Apache Commons
Publication date: 2026-06-03
Last updated on: 2026-06-03
Assigner: Apache Software Foundation
Description
Description
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDKβs ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class Γ’β¬β bypassing the accepted
classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the classβs
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(βcom.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass Γ’β¬β and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| apache | commons_lang | * |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-502 | The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid. |