Header Injection in Apache Camel IRC Component

Executive Summary

This vulnerability exists in the Apache Camel camel-irc component and involves improper input validation and neutralization of special elements, specifically header injection.

The issue arises because certain IRC-related Exchange headers (like irc.sendTo) do not have the Camel prefix and thus bypass HTTP header filtering. This allows an HTTP client to manipulate these headers and redirect IRC messages to arbitrary channels or users.

As a result, messages intended for a configured IRC channel can be sent to attacker-chosen destinations, potentially leaking message content or impersonating the bot without requiring credentials if the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated.

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Impact Analysis

This vulnerability can impact you by allowing unauthorized parties to redirect IRC messages to arbitrary channels or users.

This can lead to sensitive message content being leaked to unintended recipients or public channels.

Additionally, attackers can send messages that appear to come from the bot, potentially causing misinformation or unauthorized commands to be executed.

No authentication is required if the HTTP consumer bridging to IRC is unauthenticated, increasing the risk.

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Detection Guidance

Detection of this vulnerability involves monitoring for the presence of non-Camel-prefixed IRC headers such as irc.sendTo in HTTP requests that are bridged into the camel-irc producer. These headers allow unauthorized redirection of IRC messages.

You can inspect HTTP requests or logs for headers named irc.sendTo, irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, or irc.value being passed into the Exchange. Their presence from untrusted sources indicates potential exploitation.

Commands to detect such headers depend on your environment, but for example, if you have access to HTTP request logs or can capture traffic, you might use tools like tcpdump or Wireshark to filter HTTP headers containing 'irc.sendTo'.

• Using tcpdump to capture HTTP headers containing 'irc.sendTo': tcpdump -A -s 0 'tcp port 80 and (((ip[2:2] - ((ip[0]&0xf)<<2)) - ((tcp[12]&0xf0)>>2)) != 0)' | grep 'irc.sendTo'
• Using grep on HTTP server logs to find irc.* headers: grep -i 'irc.sendTo' /path/to/http/access.log

Additionally, review your Apache Camel routes for usage of raw irc.* headers in HTTP to IRC bridging routes, as these indicate vulnerable configurations.

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Mitigation Strategies

The primary mitigation is to upgrade Apache Camel to a fixed version: 4.21.0 or later, or to 4.14.8 or 4.18.3 if you are on the respective LTS streams.

After upgrading, update your routes to replace raw IRC header names (e.g., irc.sendTo) with the new Camel-prefixed headers (e.g., CamelIrcSendTo) to ensure proper filtering.

If immediate upgrade is not possible, strip all irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the IRC producer in your routes. For example, use removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route.

Set the IRC destination from a trusted source rather than allowing it to be controlled by inbound HTTP headers.

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