Timing Side-Channel in TPM 2.0 RSA OAEP Decryption

Executive Summary

This is a timing side-channel vulnerability in the RSA OAEP decryption implementation. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface can exploit timing differences to recover information that could allow decryption of ciphertexts encrypted to TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key (EK). This may also enable forgery of TPM 2.0 attestations under certain conditions.

Useful 0 Not Useful 0

Detection Guidance

This vulnerability involves timing side-channels in RSA OAEP decryption within TPM implementations. Detection requires analyzing timing variations during decryption operations. No direct commands are provided in the context, but monitoring TPM command execution times and comparing against baseline performance may help identify anomalies. Check for unusual delays in cryptographic operations involving TPM-managed keys.

Useful 0 Not Useful 0

Impact Analysis

An attacker could decrypt sensitive data encrypted with TPM-managed RSA keys, including credentials or session salts. This may lead to unauthorized access to encrypted information or forged attestations, compromising system integrity and confidentiality.

Useful 0 Not Useful 0

Compliance Impact

This vulnerability could lead to unauthorized decryption of sensitive data, violating confidentiality requirements in GDPR and HIPAA. Organizations may face compliance violations if protected data is exposed due to this flaw.

Useful 0 Not Useful 0

Mitigation Strategies

Update the TPM firmware and software to the latest patched versions to address the timing side-channel vulnerability in RSA OAEP decryption implementation.

Useful 0 Not Useful 0