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OttoKit WordPress Plugin Exploited Within Hours of Disclosure

Publication date: 2025-04-11
WARNING

On April 9, 2025, a critical security flaw in the OttoKit WordPress plugin (previously known as SureTriggers) was disclosed publicly. By the next morning, reports had already surfaced confirming active exploitation. Within a span of just a few hours, malicious actors leveraged this zero-day window to compromise vulnerable sites en masse — all without authentication.

 

The vulnerability, assigned CVE-2025-3102 and carrying a CVSS score of 8.1, is a case study in how seemingly small logic errors in code can unravel site-wide protections. And with more than 100,000 active installations of OttoKit, the potential attack surface was significant.

 

OttoKit’s purpose is to automate interactions between WordPress and third-party platforms, offering integration workflows much like tools such as Zapier. It is especially popular among marketers and developers seeking to streamline repetitive processes. Ironically, this drive for automation created a vector for unauthenticated admin access.

 

The Flaw: A Missing Check That Opened the Gates

 

At the heart of this vulnerability lies a flawed implementation in the plugin’s autheticate_user() function, responsible for checking the secret_key passed via the st_authorization HTTP header.

The affected code, found in the OttoKit plugin source, roughly resembles the following:

 

                public function autheticate_user($request) {
                   $secret_key = $request->get_header('st_authorization');

                   if (!is_string($secret_key) || empty($secret_key) || empty($this->secret_key)) {
                       return false;
                   }

                   list($secret_key) = sscanf($secret_key, 'Bearer %s');

                   if (empty($secret_key)) {
                       return false;
                   }

                   if ($this->secret_key !== $secret_key) {
                       return false;
                   }

                   return hash_equals($this->secret_key, $secret_key);
                }
 

The logic seems solid at first glance, but here's the catch: if no API key was configured, the $this->secret_key retrieved from the database would be empty. This meant that a request with an empty secret_key in the header could pass all the checks — including hash_equals('', '') — and thus bypass authentication altogether.

 

This is a classic authentication bypass due to incorrect input validation. When the plugin is installed and activated but not configured (i.e., missing the API key), the conditions are ripe for exploitation.

 

Attackers exploited this to send crafted HTTP requests and create new administrator accounts, gaining full control of affected websites. The attack signature observed by Patchstack even showed a repeated pattern of fake admin accounts being created with usernames like xtw1838783bc, although the exact values varied between incidents.

 

Real-World Exploitation Came Fast

 

Security firm Wordfence was among the first to analyze the flaw in detail. In a post, they outlined the exploit mechanism and confirmed that all plugin versions up to and including 1.0.78 were vulnerable. A fix was made available in version 1.0.79, published on April 3, but remained largely unnoticed until coordinated public disclosure.

 

By April 10, exploitation was confirmed in the wild. Patchstack reported that malicious traffic had already begun targeting OttoKit sites from IP addresses including 2a01:e5c0:3167::2 and 89.169.15.201.

 

What Should You Do?

 

For site administrators, the following steps are critical:

 

  1. Immediately update OttoKit to version 1.0.79 or later. This patched version adds the missing check to prevent unauthorized access.
  2. Search for suspicious administrator accounts. Use the WordPress CLI to identify recently created users: wp user list --role=administrator --field=user_login --orderby=registered Manually verify any unknown accounts.
  3. Review your logs for unexplained REST API activity. If the site was not fully configured with OttoKit, it may have been vulnerable.
  4. Consider implementing a web application firewall (WAF) to detect and block malformed authorization headers in requests targeting REST API endpoints.

 

How BaseFortify Helps

 

If your organization uses BaseFortify, this vulnerability may already be flagged and matched against your known plugin inventory. BaseFortify’s algorithms continuously cross-reference CVE disclosures with your software components — including WordPress plugins like OttoKit.

For CVE-2025-3102, BaseFortify provides:

 

  • 📌 Automated Matching: If OttoKit (or the previously known SureTriggers) plugin is detected on a client’s site, the match to CVE-2025-3102 is made immediately.
  • 🛡️ Mitigation Guidance: Each CVE report includes step-by-step mitigation actions tailored to your setup.
  • 🤖 AI Assistant: BaseFortify’s AI Assistant is embedded in each CVE report and is available to answer remediation questions, summarize the threat in plain language, or explain technical steps in more detail.
  • 📁 Historical View: You can inspect the timeline of plugin activity and see whether the plugin was active and configured correctly during the risk window.

 

These features are especially valuable for MSPs and cybersecurity teams managing multiple WordPress installations across clients. Register with BaseFortify.eu for Free and start protecting your infrastructure.

 

Conclusion

 

The OttoKit vulnerability reminds us that even well-meaning automation tools can become security liabilities if not implemented with care. A single missing check allowed attackers to escalate privileges within hours of disclosure.

At BaseFortify, our mission is to identify and neutralize these threats before they cause damage. Whether it’s by matching a plugin to its associated CVEs, offering AI-powered support, or simply keeping you informed — we stand between your assets and the chaos.

 

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