CVE-2026-93667
Awaiting Analysis
Awaiting Analysis - Queue
Type Confusion in Zephyr RTOS Virtual L2 Receive Handler
Vulnerability report for CVE-2026-93667, including description, CVSS score, EPSS score, affected products, exploitability, helpful resources, and attack-flow context.
Publication date: 2026-11-16
Last updated on: 2026-11-16
Assigner: Zephyr Project
Description
Description
The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).
The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.
The resulting call passes a struct net_if where the driver expects a struct device and a struct net_pkt where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.
The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.
CVSS Scores
EPSS Scores
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Meta Information
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendor | Product | Version / Range |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | From 4.2.0 (inc) to 4.3.2 (exc) |
| zephyrproject | zephyr | From 4.4.0 (inc) to 4.5.0 (exc) |
Helpful Resources
Exploitability
| CWE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CWE-688 | The product calls a function, procedure, or routine, but the caller specifies the wrong variable or reference as one of the arguments, which may lead to undefined behavior and resultant weaknesses. |
| CWE-843 | The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type. |
| CWE-686 | The product calls a function, procedure, or routine, but the caller specifies an argument that is the wrong data type, which may lead to resultant weaknesses. |